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##Discourse Security Guide
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The following guide covers security regarding your Discourse installation
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If you are reporting a security issue with Discourse, please email `team@discourse.org` -- we take security reports very seriously and will investigate ASAP.
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We take security very seriously at Discourse. We welcome any peer review of our 100% open source code to make sure that nobody's Discourse forum is ever compromised or hacked.
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Here are a few specific ways Discourse is as secure as we could make it:
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###Password Storage
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Discourse uses the PBKDF2 algorithm to encrypt salted passwords. This algorithm is blessed by NIST. There is an in-depth discussion about its merits in http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-security-experts-recommend-bcrypt-for-password-storage.
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Discourse uses the PBKDF2 algorithm to encrypt salted passwords. This algorithm is blessed by NIST. Security experts on the web [tend to agree that PBKDF2 is a secure choice](http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-security-experts-recommend-bcrypt-for-password-storage).
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**options you can customise in your production.rb file**
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pbkdf2_algorithm: the hashing algorithm used (default "sha256")
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pbkdf2_iterations: the number of iterations to run (default is: 64000)
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- `pbkdf2_algorithm`: the hashing algorithm used (default "sha256")
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- `pbkdf2_iterations`: the number of iterations to run (default 64000)
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### XSS
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The main vector for XSS attacks is via the "composer", as we allow users to generate rather rich markdown we need to protect against poison markdown.
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The main vector for XSS attacks is via the post composer, as we allow users to enter Markdown, HTML (a safe subset thereof), and BBCode to format posts.
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For the composer there are 2 main scenarios we protect against:
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There are 2 main scenarios we protect against:
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1. Markdown preview invokes an XSS. This is severe cause an admin may edit a user's post and a malicious user may then run JavaScript in the context of an admin.
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1. *Markdown preview invokes an XSS.* This is possibly severe in one specific case: when a forum staff member edits a user's post, seeing the raw markup, where a malicious user may have inserted code to run JavaScript. This code would only show up in the preview, but it would run in the context of a forum staff member, which is *very* bad.
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2. Markdown displayed on the page invokes an XSS.
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2. *Markdown displayed on the page invokes an XSS.* To protect against client side preview XSS, Discourse uses [Google Caja](https://code.google.com/p/google-caja/) in the preview window.
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To protect against client side "preview" XSS, Discourse uses Google Caja https://code.google.com/p/google-caja/ in the preview window.
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On the server side we run a whitelist based sanitizer, implemented using the [Sanitize gem](https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize). See the [relevant Discourse code](https://github.com/discourse/discourse/blob/master/lib/pretty_text.rb).
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On the server side we run a whitelist based sanitizer, implemented using the Sanitize gem https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize see: https://github.com/discourse/discourse/blob/master/lib/pretty_text.rb
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In addition, titles and all other places where non-admins can enter code is protected either using the Handlebars library or standard Rails XSS protection.
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In addition, titles and all other places where non-admins can enter code are protected either using the Handlebars library or standard Rails XSS protection.
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### CSRF
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CSRF allows malicious sites to perform HTTP requests pretending to be an end-user (without their knowledge) more at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
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[CSRF](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery) allows malicious sites to perform HTTP requests pretending to be an end-user (without their knowledge), mostly by getting users who already hold a valid forum login cookie to click a specific link in their web browser.
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Discourse extends the built-in Rails CSRF protection in a couple of ways:
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Discourse extends the built-in Rails CSRF protection:
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1. By default any non GET requests ALWAYS require a valid CSRF token. If a CSRF token is missing Discourse will raise an exception.
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3. Certain pages are "cachable", we do not render the CSRF token (`<meta name='csrf-token' ...`) on any cachable pages. Instead when user's are about to perform the first non GET request they retrieve the token via GET `session/csrf`
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###Deployment concerns
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### Deployment concerns
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Discourse strongly recommend that the various Discourse processes (web server, clockwork, sidekiq) run under a non-elevated account. See our install guide for details.
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Discourse strongly recommend that the various Discourse processes (web server, clockwork, sidekiq) run under a non-elevated account. See [our install guide](https://github.com/discourse/discourse/blob/master/docs/INSTALL-ubuntu.md) for details.
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###Where should I report security issues?
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In order to give the community time to respond and upgrade we strongly urge you report all security issues privately. Please email us at `info@discourse.org` with details and we will respond ASAP.
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Security issues ALWAYS take precedence over bug fixes and feature work.
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### Where should I report security issues?
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In order to give the community time to respond and upgrade we strongly urge you report all security issues privately. Please email us at `team@discourse.org` with details and we will respond ASAP. Security issues *always* take precedence over bug fixes and feature work. We can and do mark releases as "urgent" if they contain serious security fixes.
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